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FEDERAL LOYALTY PROGRAM & PROCEDURE:
ACCUSED EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE
ADVERSE WITNESSES; NECESSITY OF EVIDENCE; NECESSITY OF WITNESSES TAKING OATH
By EVERETT

ELLSWORTH SMITH

Everett E. Smith: admitted to the Minnesota bar in 1933;
practised law in Minneapolis, Washington, D.C., and Kansas
City; former appellate counsel in Denver for the Internal Revenue Service; former Assistant Judge Advocate of the Third
Army in Europe; private practice in Denver since 1954.
The case of Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 75 S. Ct. 790 (1955),
is perhaps more notable for the issues left undecided than those
passed upon. Dr. John J. Peters, an eminent professor of medicine,
had been for some years a special consultant in the United States
Public Health Service Compensation was at a specified rate per
diem for days actually worked, i. e., from four to ten days per year
when called upon by the Surgeon General. After the appropriate
agency board several times had considered the question of Dr.
Peters' loyalty to the Government of the United States and decided
the question favorably to the employee, the Loyalty Review Board
in April, 1953 decided upon its own motion to look into the matter
de novo.
At the hearing held by a panel of the Review Board in May,
1953, the only testimony offered was that in favor of the federal
employee. According to the opinion of the Supreme Court, however,
the record before the Review Board also "contained information
supplied by informants whose identity was not disclosed to petitioner," the employee. "The identity of one or more, but not all,
of these informants was known to the Board. The information given
by such informants had not been given under oath." On the record
before it, the Review Board found a reasonable doubt of Dr. Peters'
loyalty and purported to bar him from federal employment for three
years.
In the employee's suit for a declaratory judgment holding that
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his removal and debarment from employment was invalid, the
District Court for the District of Columbia granted the respondent's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting, in reliance on Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46 (App. D. C., 1950), affirmed by an equally divided
vote, 341 U. S. 918, 71 S. Ct. 669 (1951).
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment given below in the
instant case. The Court decided that the petitioner was entitled to a
declaratory judgment that his removal and debarment were invalid.
The invalidity, according to a majority of the Court, lay in the
Review Board's acting on its own motion without a referral of the
case to it by either the employee or the agency board. The Presidential Order providing for the Loyalty Review Board conferred no
authority upon the Review Board to proceed upon its own motion as
it had done. Three of the justices of the Court dissented from this
ground of the Court's holding.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Black questioned whether
the Presidential Order establishing the loyalty program was authorized. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring only in the Court's decision to
reverse the judgment below, said (at pages 350-351):
Dr. Peters was condemned by faceless informers, some
of whom were not known even to the Board that condemned him. Some of these informers were not even under
oath. None of them had to submit to cross-examination.
None had to face Dr. Peters. So far as we or the Board
know, they may be psychopaths or venal people, like Titus
Oates, who revel in being informers. They may bear old
grudges. Under cross-examination their stories might disappear like bubbles. Their whispered confidences might
turn out to be yarns conceived by twisted minds or by
people who, though sincere, have poor faculties of observation and memory.
Mr. Justice Douglas went on to add that in his opinion the decision of the Review Board deprived Dr. Peters of the liberty or
right to work, in violation of the "due process" clause, and perhaps
under the circumstances amounted to an unconstitutional equivalent of a bill of attainder.
Language similar to that of Mr. Justice Douglas was used in
the majority opinion in Parkerv. Lester, 227 F. 2d 708 (CA-9, 1955),
which case decided that merchant seamen are entitled to "due
process;" were not given it by the security-screening regulations applicable to them; and that the enforcement of the regulations should
be enjoined. In that case, the Court of Appeals had no occasion to
decide and did not purport to decide whether a government employee is entitled to "due process" before (a) he is branded as disloyal and (b) dismissed from employment. Assuming that the general right to work involved in Parker v. Lester does not include the
specific liberty to work for the government, does the "due process"
clause of the Fifth Amendment protect against the arbitrary and unreasonable imposition of the badge of infamy, the finding of disloyalty?
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Although the Supreme Court had granted certiorari "because
the case appeared to present the same constitutional question left
unresolved" by the Bailey case, supra, the majority of the Court explicitly declined, in view of the alternative ground of decision available, to consider a constitutional issue. As matters stand, therefore,
the constitutionality of a board's deciding an issue of employee
loyalty according to the procedures followed by the Review Board
in the Peters case remains to be cleared up. To express it differently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia twice has
held the Constitution gives no protection, but the Supreme Court
has not spoken.
If the handiwork of the Founding Fathers does not save their
descendants from the type of procedure described in the abovequoted language of Mr. Justice Douglas, there nevertheless appears
to be nothing in the Constitution to forbid its present-day beneficiaries from devising procedures which provide the rudiments of
a fair hearing to federal employees. To speak of the legality only,
the eighteenth-century doctrine of "due process" embodied in the
Fifth Amendment may be supplemented by a twentieth-century
legislative or executive prescription of "fair process" involving an
employee's right to confront and cross-examine any informants
willing to be sworn and testify against him under such circumstances.
As for the judiciary, it is at least doubtful whether it should
develop a doctrine of "fair process" if the coordinate branches of
government fail to make such a prescription. In any event, on the
basis of existing legal doctrines, there appears to be no authority for
court relief against administrative judgments of disloyalty and dismissal which provide scant notice, have no support in evidence and
permit no confrontation or which (about the same thing) are
"based" on undisclosed or vaguely disclosed charges of faceless informers unless (a) there happens to be an irregularity in the administrative proceedings as in the Peters case or (b) the "due process" clause or other constitutional protection is available in the
circumstances.
Beyond the ken of the courts and the scope of this note are
certain questions of policy rather than law, such as: Is the fair
treatment of public employees, whether in sensitive or non-sensitive
positions, as consistent with the public safety and security as the
determination of "loyalty" by methods such as employed by the
Review Board in the Peters case? If not, can fair treatment of the
individual employee (itself a public demand) be made reasonably
consistent with such other, supposedly conflicting, public demands
as safety and security?
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